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Echo chambers in online social networks, in which users prefer to interact only with ideologically-aligned
peers, are believed to facilitate misinformation spreading and contribute to radicalize political discourse. In this
paper, we gauge the effects of echo chambers in information spreading phenomena over political communication
networks. Mining 12 million Twitter messages, we reconstruct a network in which users interchange opinions
related to the impeachment of the former Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff. We define a continuous political
position parameter, independent of the network’s structure, that allows to quantify the presence of echo chambers
in the strongly connected component of the network, reflected in two well-separated communities of similar
sizes with opposite views of the impeachment process. By means of simple spreading models, we show that the
capability of users in propagating the content they produce, measured by the associated spreadability, strongly
depends on their attitude. Users expressing pro-impeachment sentiments are capable to transmit information,
on average, to a larger audience than users expressing anti-impeachment sentiments. Furthermore, the users’
spreadability is correlated to the diversity, in terms of political position, of the audience reached. Our method can
be exploited to identify the presence of echo chambers and their effects across different contexts and shed light
upon the mechanisms allowing to break echo chambers.
Online social networks in which users can be both con-
sumers and producers of content, such as Twitter or Facebook,
provide means to exchange information in an almost instanta-
neous, inexpensive, and not mediated way, forming a substrate
for the spread of information with unprecedented capabili-
ties. These new channels of communication have enormously
altered the way in which we take decisions, form political opin-
ions, align in front of different issues, or choose between the
adoption of different technological options [1]. Such online
communication networks are orders of magnitude larger than
those classically available in social sciences [2], making it pos-
sible to perform measurements and experiments that have led
to the definition of a new computational social science [3].
One of the characteristic features of online communication
networks is their marked degree of homophily. That is, individ-
uals prefer to interact with other individuals who are similar
to them, or share the same views and orientations [4–6]. Ho-
mophily leads to a natural polarization of societies into groups
with different perspectives, that leave digital fingerprints in
the online realm, and provide researchers with large-scale data
sets for the study of polarization in different contexts, such
as the US and French presidential elections [7], secular vs.
Islamist discussions during the 2011 Egyptian revolution [8, 9],
or the 15M movement of 2011 in Spain [10]. Political orien-
tation, in particular, has been shown to drive the segregation
of online communication networks into separated communi-
ties [11, 12]. The presence of these clusters formed by users
with a homogeneous content production and diffusion have
been named echo chambers [13], referring to the situation in
which one’s beliefs are reinforced due to repeated interactions
with individuals sharing the same points of view [14]. Echo
chambers have been shown to pervade the offline realm [15],
to be related to the spreading of misinformation [16, 17], or
∗ Corresponding author: michele.starnini@gmail.com
the development of ideological radicalism [18]. Recent studies,
however, have challenged the impact of echo chambers and
partisan segregation in communication networks over online
social media [19, 20].
This novel debate calls for a quantitative analysis aimed at
identifying the impact of political position over the diffusion
of information. In this paper, we contribute to this endeavor by
proposing a new continuous measure of political orientation,
and by quantifying its effects in the description of associated
echo chambers and the behavior of information spreading pro-
cesses running on top of online communication networks. To
this aim, we reconstruct a political communication (PC) net-
work, in which individuals exchange messages related to the
impeachment process of the former Brazilian President Dilma
Rousseff [21], over the social microblogging platform Twitter.
We collected over 12 million tweets from half million users,
in a time window of 9 months, covering the main events re-
lated to the impeachment process and related street protests.
The political orientation of users was inferred by means of a
hand-tagged analysis of the hashtags adopted in the messages,
which are assigned anti-impeachment, pro-impeachment, or
neutral sentiments.
The topological analysis of the resulting static PC network
reveals clusters of individuals sharing similar opinions, defin-
ing the presence of echo chambers. We gauge the impact of
these echo chambers over information spreading by means
of simple spreading models, characterizing the efficiency of
single users to disseminate information, or spreadability. Dif-
ferently from previous studies, to characterize information
diffusion we take into account the full temporal evolution of
the social interactions, representing it in terms of a tempo-
ral network [22, 23], so to ensure that the spreading process
respects the communication dynamics. Our analysis shows
that the spreadability of users is strongly correlated with their
political orientation: information sent by pro-impeachment
individuals spreads throughout the network much better than
ar
X
iv
:1
90
1.
03
68
8v
2 
 [p
hy
sic
s.s
oc
-p
h]
  1
7 J
ul 
20
19
2messages sent by other users. Furthermore, by analyzing the
composition of the audience reached, we discover that users
with larger spreadability are able to reach individuals with
more diverse sentiments, actually escaping their echo chamber.
POLARIZATION IN POLITICAL COMMUNICATION
NETWORKS
In Twitter, users post real-time short messages (tweets),
sometimes annotated with hashtags indicating the topic of the
message, that are broadcast to the community of their follow-
ers. A user can also transmit (retweet) messages from other
users, forwarding it to its own followers, as a way to endorse
its content. Analysis of retweets (RTs) have been used to study
viral propagation of information in several contexts [24–26].
However, RTs do not involve an explicit effort of content pro-
duction and do not convey a specific communication target.
For this reason, here we discard RTs form our analysis and
focus on tweets that include an explicit mention to another user,
with the purpose of establishing or continuing a discussion on
some topic, carrying even personal messages [27]. This choice
allows us to single out only actual social interactions between
users, so as to reconstruct a communication network in which
people actually exchange information, discuss, and form their
opinion reacting in real time to ongoing political events.
As an example of strongly polarized political discussion,
we focus on the debate ensuing the impeachment process of
the former Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff, taking place
during 2016. Tweets related to the impeachment process were
gathered by setting a specific filter for tweets containing se-
lected keywords. The keyword list was kept up to date as new
trending topics continuously appeared on Twitter, see Supple-
mentary Information (SI). Furthermore, the full dynamics of
social interactions was taken into account by including the real
timing of tweets in a temporal network representation [23].
This ensures that information diffusion over the resulting tem-
poral PC network follows time-respecting paths, which are
expected to have an effect in slowing down or speeding up the
spreading dynamics [28]. From this temporal network repre-
sentation, a static aggregated, directed, weighted network [29]
was constructed, in which a directed link from node i to node j
indicates a message sent from user i to user j. The associated
weight Wij represents the number of tweets from i to j. Note
that, while we keep the temporal evolution of the social inter-
actions when addressing information spreading dynamics, we
measure political position over the aggregated, static network
representation.
Twitter is known to be populated by social bots, that con-
tribute to the spreading of misinformation and poison political
debate [30]. Recent studies revealed that while bots tend to
interact with humans, e.g. by targeting influential users, the
opposite behavior, interactions from humans toward bots, are
far less frequent [31, 32]. For this reason, once reconstructed
the aggregated network, we extracted its largest strongly con-
nected component (SCC) [29] to possibly discard social bots
and ensure that only real social interactions between users are
considered. Our analysis is restricted only to the set of indi-
Table I: Main properties of aggregated PC network and its largest
strongly connected component (SCC): number of users N , with over-
all positive (negative) values of political position N+ (N−), total
number of interactions W , and average out-degree 〈kout〉. See Table
S8 for the PC network obtained from different hashtag classification.
N N+ N− W 〈kout〉
Whole 285670 101250 125591 2722504 5.94
SCC 31412 13925 16257 1552389 26.5
viduals composing this SCC. This choice comes at the cost
of greatly reducing the network size (almost by 90%), but it
ensures that each user can be both source and destination of
information content. In this way, information transfer is in
principle possible between any pair of users, and it is possible
to single out the impact of the network’s dynamics. In Table
I we present a summary of the main topological properties of
the PC network and its SCC. See Methods and SI for a detailed
explanation of the data set collection.
Tweets carry different sentiments, that can be characterized
by the hashtags used. We assign to each tweet t a sentiment,
st = {−1, 0,+1}, corresponding to a pro-impeachment, neu-
tral, or anti-impeachment sentiment, respectively, the second
one meaning that a hashtag can be used in the other two con-
texts. For a given user i, that has sent a number ai of tweets
(defined as his/her activity), we can associate a time-ordered
set of sentiments Si = {s1, s2, . . . , sai−1, sai}, and define
his/her average sentiment, or political position Pi, as
Pi ≡
∑ai
t=1 st
ai
, (1)
which is bounded in the interval [−1,+1]. This definition
permits to characterize user’s political position as a continuous
variable, allowing to discern different degrees of orientation,
in opposition to most common binary measures. Since such
definition crucially depends on the hashtag classification, we
checked the robustness of our results by reconstructing also
a PC network based on a different classification of neutral
hashtags. See Methods and SI for details.
In Fig. 1a) we plot the distribution of users’ political posi-
tion, showing that users are clearly split into two groups with
opposite orientation, while few users show neutral position
(P ∼ 0). Interestingly, this distribution is strongly asymmet-
ric with respect to P = 0: For P > 0 the great majority of
users have extreme position P ' +1, while for P < 0 there
is a decreasing variation, with more users having more nega-
tive values of P . The number of users with overall positive
(N+) and negative (N−) values of political positions are, how-
ever, similar, see Table I. The average sentiment of a user is
inherently correlated with his/her activity. In a scenario in
which users send tweets of opposite sentiments with the same
probability, the political position would be given by a bino-
mial distribution, and the expected average sentiment would
decrease with activity. Fig. 1b) shows that the correlation be-
tween average sentiment and activity is far from being driven
by a random process: the more active users are also the more
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Figure 1: (a) Number of users as a function of the political position P . (b) Average activity as a function of P . Only users with activity a ≥ 10
in the SCC are considered for (a) and (b). (c) Visualization of the time-aggregated representation of the PC network, formed by N = 31 412
users in the SCC. The size of nodes increases (non-linearly) with their degree. Colors represent political position, as defined by (1), blue for pro-,
red for anti-impeachment, and white for neutral average sentiment. (d) Community size and average political position of different communities
identified by the Louvain algorithm.
extreme ones. Interestingly, for pro-impeachment average sen-
timent, the most active users have P ∼ −0.75, contrary to the
case of anti-impeachment average sentiment, in which activity
is almost constant for 0 < P < 0.5, and growing for larger P .
Fig. 1c) shows a visualization of the time-aggregated repre-
sentation of the PC network, in which users are color-coded ac-
cording to their average sentiment. Two communities with op-
posite political positions are clearly visible in the PC network,
while users with neutral position are found more frequently
bridging the two groups. One can quantify this observation by
identifying the community structure [33] as obtained by means
of the Louvain algorithm [34]. In Fig. 1d) we plot the average
sentiment and size of the different communities, showing that
the PC network is characterized by two larger communities,
both with approximately 104 users and opposite position of
similar absolute values, P+ ≈ 0.82 and P− ≈ −0.70. How-
ever, negatively polarized users also form other communities of
relevant sizes with more moderate position. Users with strong
anti-impeachment average sentiments essentially belong to a
single community, while moderate users form several commu-
nities with weak pro-impeachment position. See SI For more
details.
TOPOLOGICAL EVIDENCE OF ECHO CHAMBERS
One can quantify the presence of echo chambers by relating
the political position of a user with the sentiment of the tweets
he/she receives, as well as with the position of his/her neigh-
bors. In politics, echo chambers are characterized by users
sharing similar opinions and exchanging messages with similar
political views [13]. This translates, at the topological level,
into a node i with a given position Pi connected with nodes
with a position close to Pi, and receiving with higher proba-
bility messages with similar average sentiment Pi. In order to
quantify these insights, we define, for each user i, the average
position of incoming tweets, P INi , by applying (1) to the set of
tweets from any user j 6= i mentioning user i. Analogously,
the average position of the nearest neighbors, or successors,
of user i, PNNi , can be defined as P
NN
i ≡
∑
j AijPj/kout,i,
where Aij is the adjacency matrix of the integrated PC net-
work, Aij = 1 if there is a link from node i to node j, Aij = 0
otherwise, and kout,i =
∑
j Aij is the out-degree of node i.
Figure 2 shows the correlation between the political position
of a user i and (a) the position of his/her nearest neighbors,
PNNi , and (b) the average sentiment of received tweets, P
IN
i .
Both plots are color-coded contour maps, representing the
number of users in the phase space (P, PNN) or (P, P IN): the
lighter the area in the map, the larger the density of users in
that area. Fig. 2 shows a strong correlation between the posi-
tion of a user and the average position of both his/her nearest
neighbors and the received tweets. Similar results are found for
Fig. 2(a) when considering predecessors as nearest neighbors,
see Fig. S10 in the SI. The Pearson correlation coefficient is
r = 0.89 for (P, PNN) and r = 0.80 for (P, P IN), both statis-
tically significant with a p-value p < 10−6. These topological
properties of the PC network confirm the presence of echo
chambers: users expressing both pro- and anti-impeachment
are more likely to send/receive messages to/from users that
share their political opinion.
Figure 2, however, also reveals that the densities in both
plots are not symmetric between anti- and pro-impeachment
positions: for P > 0, most users are concentrated in a small
region of the (P, PNN) and (P, P IN) spaces, while for P <
0, they spread on a larger area. This means that users with
extreme position P ' 1 are more likely to interact only with
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Figure 2: Contour maps for the (a) average political position of the nearest-neighbor PNN and (b) average sentiment of tweets received, P IN
against the average political position of a user P . Colors represent the density of users: the lighter the larger the number of users. Probability
distribution of P , PNN, and P IN are plotted in the axes. Only users with activity a ≥ 10 (corresponding to 14813 users) are considered.
users that share the same extreme position, while users with
P < 0 exchange information (send and receive tweets) also
with peers that do not share their political opinion. These
observations are also in consonance with the characterization of
the community structure, as shown in Fig. 1(d), in which users
with strong anti-impeachment average sentiment form a single,
large community, and users with pro-impeachment average
sentiment form several more heterogeneous communities.
The differences in the topological structure of the two com-
munities can be related to the political context under study:
while users characterized by anti-impeachment sentiments re-
fer to a more homogeneous political area (Partido dos Trabal-
hadores and small left-wing parties), pro-impeachment users
share different political views, including center and right-wing
positions, and show different levels of sympathy in favor to the
impeachment. Another possible and important source of asym-
metry is the constant release of content from other sources,
in particular from the traditional media, broadcasting mostly
contents that stimulate pro-impeachment sentiments, possibly
reinforcing their dissemination to a more diversified audience.
EFFECTS OF POLITICAL POSITION ON INFORMATION
SPREADING
The presence of echo chambers implies that users mainly
exchange messages with other users sharing similar sentiments.
This fact can have an impact on the way in which information
is transmitted through the whole PC networks. A possible
empirical way to gauge the effects of echo chambers on infor-
mation spreading is to consider the number of RTs that a given
user can achieve [24–26]. One can expect that more influential
users, producing content that attracts more interest, will be re-
warded by a larger number of RTs. Figure S11 (see SI) shows
the number of RTs of the users, as a function of both his/her
activity and position. One can see that the number of times
that a user is re-tweeted is strongly correlated with the activity
of that user. With hindsight, this observation is to be expected,
since a user that produces many tweets gets a larger chance of
being re-tweeted, within a homogeneous assumption of equal
probability of re-tweeting. However, if we consider the number
of RTs normalized by the total tweets sent, we observe a lack
of evident correlations with users’ political position, as shown
in Fig. S11(b) in SI.
In order to better understand the role of the network’s po-
larization in information propagation, we followed a different
approach, by considering simple models of spreading dynam-
ics. We have focused in the susceptible-infected-susceptible
(SIS) and susceptible-infected-recovered (SIR) models [35],
classical epidemic processes which have also been used to
study the diffusion of information [36, 37]. In the SIS model,
each agent can be in either of two states, susceptible or in-
fectious, whereas in SIR it can also be in a recovered state in
which it cannot be infected nor transmit the disease. Suscepti-
ble agents may become infectious upon contact with infected
neighbors, with certain transmission rate λ in both processes.
Infectious agents can spontaneously heal with rate τ−1, becom-
ing susceptible again or recovered in SIS and SIR, respectively.
Within an information diffusion framework, a susceptible node
represents a user who is unaware of the circulating informa-
tion (e.g. rumors, news, an ongoing street protest), while an
infectious user is aware of it and can spread it further to his
contacts. A recovered agent is aware but not willing to transmit
the information.
We ran the SIS and SIR dynamics on the temporal PC net-
work, using the real timing of connections between users as
given by the time stamps of interactions, so to ensure that the
information diffusion follows time-respecting paths. In tem-
poral networks characterized by an instantaneous duration of
contacts, the infection process can be implemented by consider-
5ing λ as a transmission probability, i.e. whenever a susceptible
node i gets in contact with an infectious node j, node i will
become infected with probability λ. The healing occurs spon-
taneously after a fixed time τ with respect to the moment of
infection. We start the dynamics with only one node i infected,
and stop it on the last interaction of the temporal sequence. The
set of nodes that were infected at least once along the dynamics,
started with i as source of infection, forms the set of influence
of node i, Ii [38]. The set of influence of a user thus represents
the set of individuals that can be reached by a message sent
by him/her, depending on the transmission probability λ and
healing time τ .
For different values of λ and τ , we measure the spreadability
Si of each user i, defined as the relative size of his/her set of
influence, namely
Si(λ, τ) ≡ |Ii(λ, τ)|
N
, (2)
by running a SIS or SIR dynamics with node i as seed of the
infection, averaged over several runs. In Fig. 3 we plot the
average spreadability 〈S〉 of users as a function of their political
position P and activity a for the SIS model. As expected, the
more active are the users, the larger their spreadability (darker
colors of the plots). However, one can see that 〈S〉 is not
constant with respect to the users’ political orientation: the
spreadability is clearly smaller for users with anti-impeachment
average sentiment, while it is larger for users with P < 0,
reaching a maximum for P ∼ −0.5. Different values of λ and
τ for the SIS and SIR model (available in the SI) show similar
behavior.
In order to disentangle the effect of the users’ political posi-
tion on spreadability from the effect of activity, in Fig. 4 we
plot the average spreadability of users as a function of their
position, 〈S(P )〉, for λ = 0.2 and τ = 7 days. Other values
are shown in the SI. Only users with activity bounded in the
interval a ∈ [10, 100] are considered, so as to ensure that the
average users’ activity is relatively homogeneous with respect
to their political position (as shown in the SI). Figure 4 shows
that the average spreadability reaches a maximum for users
with intermediate pro-impeachment position, P ' −0.5, maxi-
mum that is up to four times larger than the value for users with
anti-impeachment position. This striking difference is robust
with respect to the value of the transmission probability λ and
healing time τ . As shown in the SI, the shapes of the 〈S(P )〉
curves are remarkably similar, even though significantly differ-
ent values are reached. Analogous behavior is observed for the
SIR model (see SI).
DIVERSITY INCREASES SPREADABILITY
The origin of the large spreadability of users with pro-
impeachment position cannot be traced back to their numeric
prevalence in the network, since users are split into two groups
of similar size; see Table S8 in SI. Moreover, the great major-
ity of users are characterized by extreme position, |P | ' 1,
yet they show a much smaller spreadability than users with
intermediate pro-impeachment position, P ' −0.5. One way
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Figure 3: Heat map of the average spreadability 〈S〉 of users, as a
function of their political position P and activity a. The transmission
probability of the SIS dynamics is λ = 0.5 and τ = 7 days. Averages
were performed over 100 runs.
to understand this difference relies in looking at the charac-
teristics of the users reached by the spreading dynamics. One
can analyze the political position of the set of influence Ii, by
defining, for each user i, the average µi and the variance σi of
the political positions expressed by Ii, as
µi ≡
∑
j∈Ii
Pj
|Ii| , σi ≡
∑
j∈Ii
(Pj − µi)2
|Ii| . (3)
The average µi represents the average opinion of the users
reached by i, while the variance σi represents how heteroge-
neously oriented Ii is. A small variance σi indicates that the
political position of Ii is quite uniform and close its average
value, while a large value of σi shows that Ii is heterogeneous
with respect to the political position. Therefore, the variance
σi quantifies the diversity of the users reached by i.
In Fig. 4 (top panel) we plot the average political position
〈µ(P )〉 of the set of influence reached by users with position
P , showing that users with pro-impeachment (neutral, anti-
impeachment) average sentiment are more likely to reach, on
average, users sharing the same pro-impeachment (neutral, anti-
impeachment) average sentiment. This result (robust across
different values of λ and τ , as shown in the SI) indicates
that, given the strongly polarized structure of the network,
information diffusion is biased toward individuals that share the
same political opinion, quantifying the effect of echo chambers.
The average 〈µ(P )〉, indeed, gauges the strength of the echo
chambers: the more 〈µ(P )〉 is close to P , the stronger the echo
chamber effect. Furthermore, one can note differences between
users with pro- and anti-impeachment positions, µ is almost
constant for negative values of P , so echo chamber effects
are small, while µ is growing almost linearly for positive P ,
indicating stronger echo chambers effects.
Even more interesting, Fig. 4 shows that the diversity σi
of the users reached by i strongly depends on his/her political
position Pi. The curve of the average diversity as a function
of the position, 〈σ(P )〉, follows a behavior remarkably similar
to the average spreadability of users with position P , 〈S(P )〉.
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Figure 4: Average spreadability 〈S(P )〉 (black curve, left axes) of
users with political position P . Average diversity 〈σ(P )〉 (red curve,
right axes) and political position 〈µ(P )〉 (bars, top panel) of the set of
influence reached by users with position P . Transmission probability
λ = 0.20 and τ = 7 days. Only the 11386 users with activity
a ∈ [10, 100] are considered. Different ranges of a and values of λ
are shown in the SI. Results are averaged over 100 runs, error bars
represent the standard error.
The strict correlation observed between 〈σ(P )〉 and 〈S(P )〉 in-
dicates that if a user is able to reach a diverse audience, formed
by users that do not share his average sentiment, then the size of
his/her set of influence is much larger. That is, individuals with
large spreadability are able to break their echo chambers. Note
that this result is not trivial since the size of the echo chambers
are much bigger than the number of users reached. Moreover,
the value of 〈σ(P )〉 is statistically significant and does not
depend on the number of users considered in the average. For
instance, there are much more users with extreme orientations
(|P | ' 1) than users with intermediate position (P ' −0.5),
yet it holds 〈σ(P ' −0.5)〉  〈σ(|P | ' 1)〉. Furthermore,
given the larger number of users considered, error bars for
〈σ(|P | ' 1)〉 are smaller than the ones for 〈σ(P ' −0.5)〉.
DISCUSSION
The effects of echo chambers on the openness of online
political debate have been argued by the scientific community.
Recently, it has been shown that echo chambers are expected
to enhance the spreading of information in synthetic networks
[39]. Their impact in real communication networks, however,
remains poorly understood. The main contribution of this
paper is twofold: i) we quantify the presence of echo chambers
in the Twitter discussion about the impeachment of former
Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff, showing that communities
of users expressing opposite political positions emerge in the
topological structure of the communication network, and ii)
we gauge the effects of such echo chambers on information
spreading, showing that the capability of users to spread the
content they produce depends on their political orientation. The
use of spreading models allows us to characterize the internal
structure of echo-chambers, showing that users belonging to
the same echo chamber, with different convictions (i.e., the
intensity of their attitude to the impeachment issue), can have
quite different spreading capabilities.
Our method to quantify echo chambers is built upon two
main ingredients: i) we reconstruct a communication network
based in mentions, in which people can actually discuss and
exchange information related to ongoing political events, and
ii) we define a continuous political position measure, by clas-
sifying the hashtags used in tweets as expressing a sentiment
in favor or against the impeachment, which is independent
by the network’s reconstruction. We then observe that anti-
and pro-impeachment sentiments clearly separate into different
communities in the PC network. It is important to remark that,
while it is well known that networks formed by RTs can be
have a strong partisan structure, since RTs generally imply
endorsement, this observation is new for mention networks, in
which users characterized by opposite average sentiments can
easily interact [11].
These two clusters of users sharing similar opinions, or
echo chambers, can be characterized by looking at the cor-
relations between the in-flow and out-flow of sentiments, as
well as between the average sentiments of an individual and
his/her nearest neighbors. The topologies of the two echo
chambers, however, are not exactly equivalent. Users ex-
pressing anti-impeachment sentiments tend to lean towards
the extreme, achieving a position P ' +1, while users with
pro-impeachment sentiments show smoother tendencies, re-
flected into the presence of medium-sized communities with
overall negative position.
We have gauged the effects of echo chambers on information
diffusion by running simple models of information spreading,
observing that, on average, users are more likely to receive
information from peers sharing the same average sentiments.
We then see that people with predominantly pro-impeachment
sentiments are able to broadcast their message to a potentially
larger audience than other users. Furthermore, such audiences
are also characterized by a greater diversity of opinions, indi-
cating that pro-impeachment sentiments can spread to users ex-
pressing both pro- and anti-impeachment attitudes, a signature
that echo chambers can be broken. An interesting question aris-
ing here is what makes pro-impeachment users better spreaders
than users with an opposite view. Recent works [40, 41] have
related spreading efficiency of users with their topological posi-
tion in the integrated network, in particular with the degree and
centrality of individuals as measured by the k-core index [42].
In Fig. S16 of the SI we show that the average position P of
users is quite uncorrelated with both their average degree k
and k-core index, indicating that users characterized by pro-
impeachment average sentiment cannot be single out on simple
topological basis.
It is important to highlight that our method for quantifying
the echo-chamber effects by using epidemic processes comes
at the cost of limitations. A first issue is that only very large
communication networks can be analyzed, due to the extraction
7of the strongly connected component that greatly reduces the
number of nodes. However, this procedure is essential to
properly address the communication dynamics between users,
and possibly avoid the presence of social bots. Furthermore,
our definition of political position entirely relies on the hand
tagged hashtags classification. It is well known that hashtags
can be hijacked [43], i.e. they can be used by some users with a
different (or opposite) purpose than the one originally intended,
thus invalidating the sentiment inferred through it. However,
our analysis is based on a large number of hashtags, and it is
robust with respect to a significant change of the sentiment
classification; see results for the additional classification in the
SI.
Future research in this topic should address three main
points. Firstly, more sophisticated methods for detecting users’
political position, such as automatic sentiment analysis of tweet
contents could be considered. These methods are, however, not
exempt from limitations [44, 45]. Secondly, more realistic mod-
els of information diffusion, such as complex contagions, inde-
pendent cascade and linear threshold models [46–49], could be
used to estimate individual’s spreadability. We have checked
numerically that a modification of the classic Watts threshold
model for complex contagion [46] to the framework of tem-
poral networks [50] leads to the same behavior observed in
the SIR and SIS models, see Fig. S17 of the SI. Therefore,
while we do not expect our results to qualitatively depend on
the details of propagation dynamics considered, interesting
features may be added, such as a transmission probability that
depends on the similarity between opinions. It would also be
interesting to measure the evolution of users’ political position
in time, as they are expected to not be constant over the whole
temporal sequence. Finally, given that our conclusions are
based in a single case study, it would be interesting to replicate
our method in different data sets, to identify in a quantitative
way the presence of echo chambers across differently polarized
political contexts, over different social media.
METHODS
Here we describe the empirical data used in the paper, avail-
able upon motivated request to the authors, and how we recon-
struct the network from it, as well as the results of the hashtags
classification. For further details, see SI.
Reconstruction of the PC networks
Our data set is composed of tweets collected daily from the
public streaming of the Twitter API by specifying a list of 323
keywords (See Table S2 of SI) related to the impeachment
process of former president of Brazil, Dilma Rousseff. Data
have been gathered between March 5th to December 31st of
2016. Only tweets including mentions to other users and at
least one of the classified hashtags (see next Section) have
been selected, while retweets have been discarded. Tweets
containing hashtags of opposite sentiments (st = +1 and
st = −1) are less than 1%, and have been discarded. The
timing of the interactions has been preserved, so that in the
temporal PC network a directed link from node i to node j
at time t is drawn if user i sends a tweet by mentioning j at
time t. Finally, the strong component of the time-aggregated
version of the PC network has been extracted.
Hashtag classification
A list of the 495 most tweeted hashtags from the collected
data has been classified by performing a manual annotation of
the sentiments (anti-, pro-impeachment, neutral, or not related
to the issue) by four independent volunteers. Through an inter-
active webpage, the volunteers had the opportunity to browse
Twitter for checking tweets containing the selected hashtag
within the time window of interest. The final classification
of each hashtag has been determined by the majority (3 of 4)
of the opinions of the volunteers. A number of 321 (64.8%)
hashtags had a full agreement, while in 443 (89.5%) of them
at least 3 of 4 persons agreed. A majority agreement has not
been reached for 52 (10.5%) hashtags, which have been ex-
cluded from the data set. Discrepancies between any pair of
volunteers were less than 10%. A final list of 404 hashtags
(see Table S3 to S6 in the SI for final classification) has been
used to reconstruct the PC network.
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